From time to time I will follow up my July 15, 2010 post on Antony C. Sutton. Today I provide you with his own summary of his three-volume detailed study of Western technology transfer to the Soviet Union in the days of Revolution, World War, and Cold War. It is the last chapter of the last volume, but encapsulates his trilogy's whole story.
Although the policies concerning trade and technical transfers appear vague and often confused, there is one fundamental observation to be made: throughout the period of 50 years from 1917 to 1970 there was a persistent, powerful, and not clearly identifiable force in the West making for continuance of the transfers. . . .
. . . whenever the Soviet economy has reached a crisis point, Western governments have come to its assistance. . . . All along, the survival of the Soviet Union has been in the hands of Western governments.
In this study's closing pages, Sutton would admit only that he “lean[ed] to the position that there is gross incompetence in the policymaking and research sections of the State Department.” He would spend the rest of his life attempting to clearly identify that force, thereby replacing this earlier verdict of incompetence with a more satisfying one.